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09.22.25

Salam’s Government First 100 Days: Early signals and structural constraints

Lea Ghandour,
Sami Atallah,
Sami Zoughaib

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Lebanon entered 2025 amid overlapping crises: economic collapse, the devastation of the 2024 war, and years of political paralysis. The national currency had lost nearly all its value, poverty engulfed more than 60% of households, and reconstruction needs were estimated at $14 billion. In this fragile context, a political breakthrough occurred: the election of Joseph Aoun as president on January 9, followed by Nawaf Salam’s formation of a fully mandated government on February 8—the first since 2021.

This report evaluates the Salam government’s first 100 days, benchmarking its performance against two yardsticks: (1) the record of Najib Mikati’s 2021 non-caretaker cabinet, and (2) progress on three national priorities essential to recovery—advancing IMF reforms, initiating reconstruction, and operationalizing the National Social Protection Strategy (NSPS).

The findings reveal a government that is more active and engaged than its predecessor, but still constrained by entrenched veto structures:

◊ Executive Activation: Salam’s cabinet convened 12 sessions (vs. Mikati’s 3) and issued 277 decrees and laws (vs. 141), including 35 regulatory texts (vs. 4). His government also made more appointments, accepted more international contributions, and issued fewer discretionary transfers and licenses.

◊ Regulatory Activity Without Depth: Salam’s regulatory footprint spanned 13 policy sectors, but most texts were procedural—clarifying procedures, adjusting compensations, or issuing temporary measures. The only structural reform was the amendment to the banking secrecy law.

◊ Administrative Recalibration: The government made 35 appointments (including 7 in defense and security, compared to none under Mikati), approved 107 contributions worth $14 million, and authorized fewer transfers and licenses. These shifts suggest greater external engagement and some restraint in clientelist practices, though motivations remain ambiguous.

◊ National Priorities Still Blocked:

- IMF Reforms: Salam reactivated key files (Bank Resolution Law, bank restructuring strategy, banking secrecy amendments) but avoided decisive steps such as bank audits, capital controls, and fiscal planning. Vetoes by banks, Banque du Liban, and allied political parties remain intact.

- Reconstruction: Despite appointing a ministerial committee, the government has made no substantive headway on reconstruction. There is still no national framework or implementation roadmap, leaving responses ad hoc and fragmented. Rubble removal which started months after the war is largely complete, but no government funding has been earmarked for rebuilding or compensation.

- Social Protection: The NSPS remains sidelined. Salam extended donor-funded, poverty-targeted programs rather than moving toward universal, rights-based coverage. This perpetuates Lebanon’s clientelist welfare regime, reinforced by donor preferences for humanitarian triage.

In short, Salam has reactivated executive machinery but has not yet translated activity into systemic reform.

The Salam government’s first 100 days demonstrate that Lebanon no longer suffers from outright executive paralysis. Cabinet meets regularly, decrees are issued, and institutions are staffed. This is not trivial. Yet activation has not become transformation.

The same veto players that have long blocked reform remain powerful. Banks and BDL shield financial interests from loss recognition. Reconstruction remains on hold, with no strategy or funding in place. Sectarian brokers and donors sustain a fragmented welfare system. Salam has worked around these constraints but not confronted them.

This leaves Lebanon at a political crossroads, with three potential trajectories:

1. Energetic Management of Stasis: Cabinet remains functional, output stays high, but reforms are shallow. Lebanon gains procedural governance but no structural change.

2. Reformist Confrontation: Salam leverages his legitimacy to challenge veto players—pushing for capital controls, fiscal strategy, and a national reconstruction plan. This risks political backlash but could reorient Lebanon’s trajectory.

3. Donor-Driven Conditionality: International actors impose stricter conditions, forcing selective reforms in banking or energy. This may unlock financing but risks deepening inequality and weakening sovereignty.

The first 100 days suggest that Salam is closer to energetic stasis than reformist rupture. Whether he evolves into a reformer willing to confront entrenched interests will determine not just his legacy but Lebanon’s path out of crisis.

 


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