The devastation left behind the 2024 Israel war on Lebanon is immense, and violence has not subsided fully yet as weekly bombardments and a continued occupation maintain Lebanon in limbo. Homes are destroyed, infrastructures are razed, families are shattered, and many communities continue to be forcefully displaced. To be sure, reconstruction cannot wait for the violence to stop, and the urgency of a strategy that would put the country on a course for recovery is widely felt. In this context, this government placed reconstruction as one of its priorities and calls for framing an adequate approach reverberate across government halls, donor meetings, and humanitarian agencies. Yet many of these voices echo earlier episodes, when so-called reconstruction processes deepened dependence on external forces and reinforced an internally dysfunctional system of rule, ultimately eroding national sovereignty.

This is not the first time that parts of Lebanon are reduced to rubble. However, the depth of the state’s crisis seems to have reached an alarming level: infrastructure is exceedingly deficient, territorial governance uneven and deeply contested, and sovereignty severely challenged from within and without. In short, the very legitimacy of the State’s rule is in question. It is evident that this grim reality finds its roots in the civil war, but especially its aftermath, whereby the Lebanese state has consistently favored a brokerage role over a framework of national governance, becoming largely dependent on external aid and debt. Worse, the state has become fragmented in purpose. Its territorial presence following the civil war (1975-1990) was never fully restored. This withdrawal is not merely a symptom of incapacity. It reflects a deeper modality of selective governance that has since independence privileged spaces attractive to capital and neglected those deemed peripheral.

Lebanon’s current moment presents a painful convergence of two long-standing failures: the failure of the state to protect its citizens and the long-term normalization of delegated governance to sectarian and non-state actors. Both have undermined the possibility of a shared national project.

In this piece, we argue that reconstruction must be seized as an opportunity not only to repair physical destruction, but to confront Lebanon’s dual crisis head-on—to reimagine the role of the state, re-anchor sovereignty in institutions, and mend a national fabric frayed by decades of selective abandonment. For it to be meaningful and lasting, reconstruction requires the state to reclaim sovereignty in full—not through military deployments or symbolic gestures, but by reasserting central responsibility and a coherent institutional framework, mobilizing domestic resources before external aid, harnessing Lebanon’s own human capital and expertise, and embedding genuine community participation. Only then can Lebanon rebuild—not just the ruins of war, but the trust, cohesion, and legitimacy without which a sovereign state cannot endure.

The Crisis of Statehood in Lebanon

Lebanon’s crisis today is fundamentally a crisis of statehood. At its heart lies the erosion of the state’s legitimacy, authority, and presence across national territory. The state’s retreat is starkly evident in Lebanon’s peripheral regions. From rural Akkar in the north, to Hermel and the northeastern borderlands, to urban peripheries such as Beirut’s southern and eastern districts, vast areas have long been governed as zones of exception—receiving sporadic state attention, conditional services, and occasional militarized interventions rather than sustained investment and accountable governance. Over time, this retreat extended even further, leaving large swathes of territory to be managed by non-state militarized forces and other non-governmental actors. The result has been a shared experience of marginalization, clientelism, securitization, and neglect, producing fractured sovereignty and deepening inequalities.

Among marginalized regions, South Lebanon embodies these dynamics with particular intensity. Historically integrated economically and socially with the Galilee, the South was violently severed from its hinterland following 1948 Nakba, transforming into a militarized frontier repeatedly subjected to Israeli aggression. Between 1978 and 2000, Israeli occupation institutionalized the South’s isolation from the Lebanese state. Even after Israel’s withdrawal in 2000, the state returned only symbolically, outsourcing the task of governance and reconstruction to political-sectarian actors—most prominently Hezbollah and Amal—and international donors. As a result, sovereignty in the South remained partial, contested, and delegated.

The 2024 war exacerbated this historical pattern. Once again, South Lebanon bore the brunt of Israel’s violence, exposing the state’s inability—or unwillingness—to protect or meaningfully govern the region. Yet, the South’s devastation is not unique; rather, it is symptomatic of a broader condition affecting many of Lebanon’s “peripheralized” districts. Whether northeastern border towns, rural regions such as Akkar, or marginalized urban neighborhoods, the absence of effective state presence has undermined national cohesion, fueled sectarian clientelism, and fragmented territorial integrity.

Why Sovereign Reconstruction?

A successful post-disaster recovery needs to locate the devastation accrued by the war in relation to the patterns that weakened the country’s resilience, leaving homes and communities vulnerable. To turn the tides, Lebanon’s post-war recovery must break with past patterns that exacerbated dependence on foreign aid and debt and systematically delegated the critical tasks of rebuilding to private and non-profit actors. True, international assistance remains necessary, but it must be anchored within a coherent national strategy led by the Lebanese state.

Sovereign reconstruction directly counters this trend. Sovereignty in this context means that the Lebanese state—not external donors or political-sectarian actors—defines the reconstruction agenda, coordinates resources, and leads implementation. Sovereign leadership does not reject external support but ensures it aligns clearly with national priorities. Crucially, sovereignty prevents the Lebanese state from being relegated to the role of a logistical facilitator rather than an accountable and effective governing authority.

Furthermore, in Lebanon, sovereign reconstruction is more than institutional efficiency—it is fundamentally existential. The recent conflict has dangerously revived tendencies toward further sectarianizing national tragedies. Already, the destruction in the South is framed by some as a communal burden tied to the political choices of one sect. Such narratives fracture national solidarity, erode shared citizenship, and undermine the very foundations of national unity.

A sovereign reconstruction offers a powerful response to these divisive narratives. Historically, Lebanon’s reconstruction efforts have often fallen captive to sectarian and oligarchic interests, allowing local leaders and political elites to monopolize recovery initiatives within their respective regions, communities and networks. Sovereign reconstruction explicitly rejects this fragmented logic by asserting the devastation of the South as a national catastrophe requiring collective national responsibility—not as an act of charity or conditional solidarity. It ensures no community is left alone to shoulder the burden of war due to sectarian framings or political allegiances.

Moreover, sovereign reconstruction is essential precisely because it provides the state the necessary leverage to resist and actively counteract three major threats of capture. First, sovereign reconstruction counters the risk of political conditionality imposed by external actors and donors. Foreign assistance frequently arrives with political agendas, security demands, and/or economic conditions attached. Without sovereign oversight, external actors can exploit Lebanon’s dependency, effectively holding people’s livelihoods hostage to secure political concessions. In other words, reconstruction aid risks becoming a mechanism through which donors dictate Lebanon’s political-economic priorities, thereby undermining national autonomy. Sovereign reconstruction places Lebanese interests at the center, ensuring reconstruction priorities reflect national goals rather than external demands.

Second, sovereign reconstruction actively prevents political capture by domestic elites. Without assertive state leadership, reconstruction efforts can be exploited by sectarian politicians and local power-brokers to consolidate their authority, reward their supporters, and deepen patronage networks. Sovereignty ensures transparent governance, clear accountability, and institutional mechanisms that safeguard reconstruction as a genuine national endeavor rather than a tool for political exploitation.

Third, sovereign reconstruction safeguards against the threat of capture by capital interests. Reconstruction often attracts private capital eager to exploit opportunities created by war-induced vulnerabilities, acquiring valuable land cheaply, displacing local communities, and reshaping local economies for private profit rather than public benefit. Sovereign oversight provides the regulatory strength, land-use transparency, and community protections necessary to ensure reconstruction advances collective welfare rather than private gain.

In short, sovereignty means authority over the reconstruction agenda, leadership, and resistance to all forms of capture.  The Lebanese state must seize this opportunity decisively—to reassert nationhood over sectarian grievances, reclaim the South as central and integral to Lebanon’s national fabric, and reaffirm the principle that if Lebanon is to meaningfully exist, it must be founded on shared burdens and shared futures. Thus, sovereign reconstruction is about defending the very idea of the Lebanese state itself.

Four Pillars for Sovereign Reconstruction

A sovereign reconstruction requires deliberately reordering Lebanon’s political priorities, institutional arrangements, and mechanisms of implementation. Reconstruction must be understood as both a political and logistical undertaking. It is built upon the recognition that rebuilding the devastated areas, particularly the South, necessitates strengthening state capacities, empowering local communities, promoting national equity among citizens, and reinforcing territorial integrity.

The first step is establishing a clearly defined national institutional setup where the state takes central responsibility for setting the vision and directing the recovery process. This institutional arrangement must ensure that roles played by international aid agencies, private actors, sectarian-political actors and non-profit organizations complement rather than overshadow or fragment state leadership. Instead of creating new institutions, the state should seek to establish an institutional framework that leverages existing agencies such as the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), the Directorate General of Urbanism, and municipalities, reform their roles and responsibilities, coordinate their activities, build their capacity, and subject them to rigorous scrutiny from parliament and oversight agencies designed explicitly to avoid elite capture, corruption, or political manipulation. To this end, Lebanon can build on the active role of research agencies and universities that have demonstrated strong will to play this role over the past decades.

Additionally, it is crucial to promptly articulate a regulatory framework clearly defining reconstruction modalities and establishing the legal basis for rebuilding. This framework must prioritize ease of rebuilding for citizens, ensure fairness and equity, and protect urban and cultural heritage and ecological systems that are vital for long-term community recovery. Lebanon has extensive existing studies and technical expertise, which have remained unused due to political inaction; mobilizing and utilizing these resources and recapacitating the state is essential.

The second pillar emphasizes mobilizing domestic resources as a foundational strategy before relying significantly on international aid. Despite Lebanon’s severe financial crisis limiting the state’s fiscal capacities, full dependence on external funding must be avoided. Historical Lebanese precedents demonstrate that sovereign, domestically funded reconstruction initiatives are viable. For instance, following the 1956 earthquake, Lebanon introduced a National Solidarity Tax, pooling domestic resources for reconstruction. Similar innovative mechanisms—potentially leveraging targeted taxation or reconstruction bonds—could be applied today, exemplifying national self-reliance and preserving state sovereignty.

International examples further illustrate how even countries facing severe economic constraints can prioritize domestic resources in reconstruction. Rwanda, recovering from genocide and extreme poverty, mobilized community labor and national planning strategies to limit donor dependency. South Korea, emerging from war, focused on public investment and redirected domestic capital towards national infrastructure. Chile, following the devastating 2010 earthquake, successfully introduced temporary corporate profit taxes to finance state-led reconstruction. These examples provide practical models Lebanon could emulate. In Vietnam, after decades of war ending in 1975, the state prioritized national resource mobilization, collective labor schemes, land reforms, and strategic public investments. Despite severe economic constraints and international isolation, Vietnam relied primarily on internal resources and local capacities.

The third pillar highlights the necessity of leveraging Lebanon’s extensive local human capital and expertise. Lebanese engineers, urban planners, architects, environmental experts, administrators, and contractors have historically been sidelined in externally-driven reconstruction models. Sovereign reconstruction must reverse this trend by explicitly prioritizing local employment and expertise, integrating universities, professional syndicates, technical institutions, and local companies throughout all phases—from design to execution. This approach would generate domestic employment, reduce brain drain, and ensure reconstruction reflects Lebanese aspirations and capabilities, rather than external visions imposed by foreign consultants and corporations.

The final pillar stresses the importance of meaningful community involvement. Reconstruction should adopt a bottom-up, people-centered approach rather than a top-down, profit-led approach. Local municipalities, cooperatives, and civil society organizations, particularly in historically marginalized regions like the South, should actively participate in identifying local needs, setting priorities, and monitoring implementation. Embedded and participatory planning processes empower communities to shape a recovery that fits best their needs, while they also guarantee greater equity and accountability and shield reconstruction efforts from becoming vehicles for political patronage and clientelism.

Ultimately, these pillars help transform reconstruction from merely repairing physical infrastructure into an effort to shape the scaffolding of an alternative future. Sovereign reconstruction becomes a project to rebuild public trust, restore equity, and reaffirm the Lebanese state’s legitimacy as the guarantor of a shared national space. Only through state leadership can reconstruction achieve this broader goal of national renewal and recovery.

Conclusion

The devastation of South Lebanon presents a crucial opportunity for the Lebanese state to reclaim its legitimacy. Reconstruction must go beyond repairing physical infrastructure; it must fundamentally reshape how the state acts, for whom it acts, and with what vision. Legitimacy will not return through military deployments, monopolizing force, or symbolic actions alone. It will emerge when communities are empowered to rebuild their towns, when public services are restored and secured as rights rather than favors, and when reconstruction becomes a visible expression of national equity and inclusion.

Sovereign reconstruction thus offers Lebanon a path toward renewing the social contract and restoring national cohesion. This is an opportunity to rebuild what war has destroyed, as well as what decades of neglect have eroded: the belief that Lebanon belongs equally to all its citizens, and that the state is capable of serving them. Sovereignty, in this context, is not abstract and must be practiced immediately, clearly, and decisively.