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09.22.25

One Hundred Days of Nawaf Salam: Governing between momentum and veto

Lea Ghandour,
Sami Atallah,
Sami Zoughaib

By early 2025, Lebanon was staggering under the combined weight of economic collapse, the devastation of Israel’s 2024 war, and years of institutional paralysis. The lira had lost nearly all its value, poverty affected well over half the population, and reconstruction needs far exceeded available resources. The war alone inflicted an estimated $14 billion in damages, deepening an already dire recovery challenge.

Against this backdrop came a political breakthrough. On January 9, Joseph Aoun was elected president after years of vacancy. Less than a month later, Nawaf Salam secured parliamentary confidence, forming the first fully mandated government since 2021. Unlike Najib Mikati’s caretaker cabinets—defined by drift and crisis management—Salam’s team immediately set a different pace.

In its first hundred days, the government convened fourteen cabinet sessions, compared to Mikati’s five, and issued more than twice as many decrees, and advanced a wider set of public appointments and regulatory texts.

The change in tempo is undeniable. Yet the real test lies ahead: whether this momentum can deliver on the country’s defining priorities—securing an IMF agreement, launching a credible reconstruction program, and activating a national social protection system—or whether it will remain a more energetic management of the status quo. Lebanon has shifted from paralysis to activation, yet the entrenched structures of power that block systemic reform remain fully intact.

Decrees Without Depth

Salam’s cabinet issued 264 decrees in its first hundred days—more than double Mikati’s 119. Of these, 22 were regulatory texts, compared to only two under Mikati.1 On the surface, this marks a more assertive executive posture and broader engagement across policy sectors.

Yet the quality of regulation tells a different story. Many texts dealt with procedural clarifications, temporary allowances, exam cancellations, or compensation adjustments. These were legally binding regulations, but their function was largely corrective and temporary rather than structural. Only one initiative—the amendment to the banking secrecy law—altered a core legal framework.

In effect, the government has widened its regulatory footprint across areas such as macroeconomics, education, labor, and defense, but without tackling deeper reforms. What emerged was regulatory activity without systemic transformation: rules that manage crisis pressures rather than reconfigure the state’s foundations.

Administrative Shifts, but Patronage Intact

The Salam government made 38 public-sector appointments, including seven senior posts in defense and security—areas Mikati avoided. It also issued fewer financial transfers (15 versus Mikati’s 38) and fewer licenses, while approving over 100 donor contributions worth $14 million. These choices hint at restraint and at growing donor confidence.

But restraint may have less to do with principle than with necessity. Fewer transfers could reflect cash shortages. Fewer licenses may stem from economic stagnation. While some appointments were merit-based, the process remains opaque. Lebanon’s patronage system has not been dismantled; it has only quieted.

The Real Test: National Priorities Still Stalled

Symbolic activity counts for little if it does not advance the structural priorities that define Lebanon’s recovery: an IMF agreement, post-war reconstruction, and the activation of a national social protection system. On all three, the Salam government has made only partial progress.

IMF Reforms: Technical Work, Political Red Lines

Nowhere is the tension clearer than on the IMF track. Salam’s cabinet dusted off technical files: drafting a Bank Resolution Law, amending banking secrecy, and sketching a restructuring plan. But the core pillars remain blocked.

No capital controls exist because banks and their political patrons resist any measure that would formalize loss recognition. External audits of commercial banks have stalled under pressure from financial elites. The central bank’s asset audit remains unpublished, and no fiscal strategy has been adopted.

In short, Salam has reopened files, but he has not forced decisions. The banking lobby, Banque du Liban, and their political allies remain the veto players. Without breaking their grip, IMF negotiations cannot move from symbolism to substance.

Reconstruction: From Rubble to a Vacuum of Leadership

Reconstruction is the sector where Lebanon’s needs are greatest and progress weakest. The government formed a five-member ministerial committee, but nearly a year after the war’s end no comprehensive national recovery strategy has been articulated. Meanwhile, the government controls $7 billion2 in public funds but has directed none of it toward recovery.

Rubble clearance began only months after the war ended; however, actual rebuilding has yet to start, and affected populations have received no compensation. Municipalities and households have been left to improvise, responding to piecemeal without state guidance or support. Despite rhetorical commitments, the government’s approach has been marked by inertia, fragmentation, and misplaced priorities.3

Social Protection: Rights Deferred, Again

The National Social Protection Strategy (NSPS) is Lebanon’s first rights-based plan, that offers a structural shift from fragmented unsustainable welfare models. Within the first 100 days, the government signaled direction towards implementing some of its elements: the Social Affairs Ministry extended the emergency cash-transfer safety net Aman which reaches 60% of the poor; later, Nawaf Salam pledged to implement the NSPS and pursue NSSF changes.4

Implementation steps, however, were not formalized in this period. Despite Aman’s role in being a necessary safety net to the country’s poorest families, it cannot substitute for a legislated, and financed national protection systems.

The Crossroads Ahead

The first hundred days of Salam’s government have shown what reactivation looks like. Cabinet meets, decrees flow, appointments happen. It is a break from caretaker drift. But activation is not the same as transformation.

Lebanon’s fundamental problem is not the absence of government activity—it is the stranglehold of entrenched vetoes. This leaves Salam at a political crossroads. Three scenarios loom:

1. Energetic Stasis. Cabinet continues to function, but avoids confrontation. Output remains high but shallow. Reconstruction remains fragmented, IMF talks symbolic, social protection limited. The government becomes a more efficient caretaker.

2. Reformist Confrontation. Salam uses his legitimacy to confront veto players—pushing for capital controls, a fiscal plan, and a binding reconstruction framework. This would risk cabinet fractures and political backlash but could shift Lebanon’s trajectory.

3. Donor-Driven Conditionality. External actors tighten conditions on aid, forcing selective reforms in banking or energy without a domestic consensus. This may unlock funds but risks entrenching inequality and eroding sovereignty.

Lebanon’s war-battered society needs more than procedural government. Salam has proven he can reactivate the executive. But whether he can transform it depends on confronting the very interests that have trapped Lebanon for decades.

He now faces a choice: remain the activator of a paralyzed system, or become the reformer willing to challenge its vetoes. His legacy—and Lebanon’s post-war recovery—will hinge on which role he embraces.

This article is based on a forthcoming report.

 


1. This dataset was compiled from the Official Gazette and coded according to the CAP framework.

2. Al‑Akhbar. 2025. الأخبار " من أجل ماذا كل هذا التقشّف؟ 7 مليارات دولار في حسابات الدولة", http://bit.ly/4qvTCBd

3. Al‑Akhbar. 2025. الأخبار "الدولة تحضر جنوباً... لمنع إعادة الإعمار!", https://www.al-akhbar.com/lebanon/825235

4. National News Agency. 2025. “Salam Heads Meeting on Social Safety Nets Reform.” NNA, https://nna-leb.gov.lb/en/politics/765725/salam-heads-meeting-on-social-safety-nets-reform-s 

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